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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
SEGREGATION-WHETHER A CONVICTION OF NEGRO STUDENTS FOR Dis-
TURBING THE PEACE FOR SITTING AT "WHITE" LUNCH COUNTERS VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Whether a
conviction of Negro students for disturbing the peace for sitting at "white"
lunch counters violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was presented to the United States Supreme Court in the combined
cases of Garner v. Louisiana, Briscoe v. Louisiana, and Hoston v. Louis-
iana.'
It appears that the police were notified of -the students' presence at
the white lunch counter-notification in one case coming from the "owner
or his agent,"2 and from observers in the other two cases. It further ap-
pears that in the Garner and Hoston cases, the students remained at the
"white" lunch counters with the implied consent of the management.8
Upon arrival, the police "without consulting the manager or anyone
else on the premises, went directly to confront ,the petitioners," 4 "asked
the petitioners to leave the counter because 'they were disturbing the peace
by sitting there,' "5 and, when the students refused to leave, arrested them
for disturbing the peace.
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed the
convictions. Chief Justice Warren expressed the views of six members of
the Court that the convictions were so devoid of evidentiary support that
they were rendered unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus making it "unnecessary to reach the broader
constitutional questions presen-ted."
6
1 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
2 Id. at 171.
3 Id. at 199.
4 Id. at 172.
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 163.
Petitioners had contended that:
(a) The decision below affirms a criminal conviction based upon no evidence of
guilt and, therefore, deprives them of due process of law.
(b) The State statute under which they were convicted was so vague, indefinite,
and uncertain as to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
(c) The decisions below conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression.
(d) The decision below conflicts with prior decisions of this Court which con-
demn racially discriminatory administration of State criminal laws in contra-
vention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, the Court did not pass upon contentions 2, 3 and 4 above.
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Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion 7 that "if all the con-
stitutional questions are to be put aside and the problem treated merely
in terms of disturbing the peace, I would have difficulty in reversing the
judgment."8  He would then reach the constitutional questions which
would make reversal necessary.
He apparently views the factual situation as follows: Negroes "sat-in"
at lunch counters or restaurants catering only -to white customers. The
police officers making the arrests were acting in accordance with state
"custom" and enforced a policy of segregation in restaurant facilities. He
stated: "It is my view that a State may not constitutionally enforce a policy
of segregation in restaurant facilities." 9
Justice Douglas, in the above statement, intertwined the two separate
and distinct concepts of "state action," and "public facility." He would
have the judgment reversed because states may not enforce a policy of
racial segregation in a "public facility." How does he arrive at the con-
clusion that "state policy" in effect, is operating on a "public facility?"
Recognizing that it is only "state action that is prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the action of individuals,"'10 Justice Douglas
notes Justice Bradley's statement in the Civil Rights Cases"' that:
"... civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsup-
ported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings.' 1 2 (Italics added by Justice Douglas) He then cites
Baldwin v. Morgan13 for the proposition that the " 'custom, practice and
usage' of a city and its police in arresting four Negroes for using the
'white' waiting room (of a public facility) was state action in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendmen't, even though no ordinance was promulgated
and no order issued."'14
Relying on the preamble to Act no. 630, La. Acts 1960, and other
enumerated statutes,15 Justice Douglas concludes that "segregation is basic
to the structure of Louisiana as a community; the custom that maintains
it is at least as powerful as any law."16
7 Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Harlan concurred in the judgment in separate
opinions.
8 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 177.
9 Id. at 181.
10 Id. at 177.
11 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 178.
13 Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
14 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 179.
15 Ibid.
16 Id. at 181.
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But it is submitted that this is a pretty weak foundation to base his
conclusion upon. Act 630, a proposed amendment to the Louisiana Con-
stitution, deals with the possible integration of any tax-supported facility
in ,the state, providing inter alia that "any facility of government which is
maintained by a tax voted by any political subdivision of the state and
which was segregated according to race at the time of the election at which
the tax was authorized shall be declared by the governing authority of the
subdivision to be no longer a function of the government when it is ordered
integrated by any commission, board, or other authority."' 17
Why detach the preamble to a specific act and attempt to relate it to
other enumerated acts? i s Justice Douglas takes the preamble from Act 630,
combines it with other specific statutes that require segregation under
enumerated conditions, and arrives at the conclusion that even though there
is no state law or municipal ordinance that requires segregation of the
races in restaurants, "it is plain that the proprietors in the instant cases
were segregating blacks from whites pursuant to Louisiana's custom."'19
Can't the proprietors also choose segregation? Apparently not, as
"this preference does not make the action 'private' rather than 'state'
action." But doesn't this viewpoint, if carried to its logical extreme, lead
to the ultimate conclusion that any private action, if mentioned anywhere
in a statute, becomes state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?
It is at this point that the second concept relating to a "public facility"
is woven into the decision, for he said: "We have held on numerous occa-
sions that the States may not use their powers -to enforce racial segregation
in public facilities." 21 Still relying on his conclusion that racial segrega-
tion in restaurants is the policy of Louisiana, without which reliance the
opinion would have no meaning, Justice Douglas invokes the "licensing"
concept to transform private property into property "affected with a public
17 See Harvard, The 1960 Proposals to Amend the Louisiana Constitution, 21 La. L.
Rev. 121 (1960).
18 See Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, at p. 94 (1958):
But granted that a preamble can sometimes assist in the construction of the
statute, the chances are equally good that it will create a doubt or ambiguity.
(Especially, it is contended by this writer, when it is used to introduce other
acts to which it was not intended to apply.) A statute may be clear enough,
but a loosely worded preamble (or a loosely used one) may drive a court to an
interpretation that cannot reasonably be sustained by the statute itself. ...
19 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 183.
20 Ibid.
21 But, alas, the horses soon turned back into mice, just as I shall show that a
private restaurant, changed into a public facility by judicial fiat, is, in reality, still a
private restaurant.
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interest," much like Cinderella's fairy godmother changing drab mice into
luxurious carriage horses.22
Justice Douglas, for example, states that:
"I do not believe that a State that licenses a business can license it




"Those who run a retail establishment under permit from a mu-
nicipality operate in my view a public facility .... -24
Again, Justice Douglas goes to the Revised Statutes of Louisiana 25
to support his view, and comes up with a series of statutes which involve
broad powers of the local Boards of Health in reference to inspection and
issuance of permits which require, inter alia, sanitary facilities and equip-
ment in restaurants. "The City of Baton Rouge in its City Code requires
all restaurants to have a permit. Tit. 6 c. 7 § 601."26 But, from the other
provisions of the Baton Rouge Code cited, it can be seen that this is also
a requirement bound up with the public health. These statutes are enacted
to regulate the public health, a recognized police power of a state. The
power to regulate includes the power to license.27 But, as was pointed out
in Tyson v. Banton:
"A license may be required, but such a license is not a franchise
which puts the proprietor under the duty of furnishing entertain-
ment to the public, or, if furnished, of admitting everyone who
applies."2 8
If this reasoning is valid as regards a theatre, why is it invalid when ap-
plied to a restaurant? This writer submits that it is not invalid.
The final step in the reasoning process is to paraphrase the opinion
in Nebbia v. New York 29 to state that restaurants in Louisiana have a
"public consequence" and "affect the community at large."30
But is a restaurant affected with a public interest merely because the
public "derives benefit, accommodation, ease or enjoyment from the ex-
22 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 183.
23 Id. at 184.
24 Id. at 183.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
28 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 440 (1927).
29 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
30 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 183.
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istence or operation of the business"?3' The Supreme Court of the United
States held no, in the Tyson case, supra, which is still good law today.
32
Apparently then the ultimate issue which the Supreme Court must
resolve will be which of two rights is supreme; the right to eat in a private
restaurant, or the right to pick and choose one's customers, in one's private
business.
SAM S. CRUTCHFIELD, JR.
31 Tyson v. Banton, supra note 28, at 430.
32 Ibid. ".... .while the word (interest) has not always been limited narrowly as
strictly denoting a 'right,' that synonym more nearly than any other expresses the sense
in which it is to be understood."
